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Abstract 
This paper deals with the problem of esti­
mating the probability that one event was 
a cause of another in a given scenario. Us­
ing structural-semantical definitions of the 
probabilities of necessary or sufficient cau­
sation (or both), we show how to optimally 
bound these quantities from data obtained 
in experimental and observational studies, 
making minimal assumptions concerning the 
data-generating process. In particular, we 
strengthen the results of Pearl (1999) by 
weakening the data-generation assumptions 
and deriving theoretically sharp bounds on 
the probabilities of causation. These results 
delineate precisely how empirical data can be 
used both in settling questions of attribution 
and in solving attribution-related problems 
of decision making. 
1 Introduction 
Assessing the likelihood that one event was the cause 
of another guides much of what we understand about 
(and how we act in) the world. For example, few 
of us would take aspirin to combat headache if it 
were not for our conviction that, with high proba­
bility, it was aspirin that "actually caused" relief in 
previous headache episodes. [Pearl, 1999] gave coun­
terfactual definitions for the probabilities of neces­
sary or sufficient causation (or both) based on struc­
tural model semantics, which defines counterfactuals 
as quantities derived from modifiable sets of func­
tions [Galles and Pearl, 1997, Galles and Pearl, 1998, 
Halpern, 1998, Pearl, 2000, chapter 7]. 
The central aim of this paper is to estimate proba­
bilities of causation from frequency data, as obtained 
in experimental and observational statistical studies. 
In general, such probabilities are non-identifiable, that 
is, non-estimable from frequency data alone. One 
factor that hinders identifiability is confounding -
the cause and the effect may both be influenced 
by a third factor. Moreover, even in the absence 
of confounding, probabilities of causation are sensi­
tive to the data-generating process, namely, the func­
tional relationships that connect causes and effects 
[Robins and Greenland, 1989, Balke and Pearl, 1994]. 
Nonetheless, useful information in the form of bounds 
on the probabilities of causation can be extracted from 
empirical data without actually knowing the data­
generating process. We show that these bounds im­
prove when data from observational and experimental 
studies are combined. Additionally, under certain as­
sumptions about the data-generating process (such as 
exogeneity and monotonicity), the bounds may col­
lapse to point estimates, which means that the prob­
abilities of causation are identifiable - they can be ex­
pressed in terms of probabilities of observed quantities. 
These estimates often appear in the literature as mea­
sures of attribution, and our analysis thus explicates 
the assumptions that must be ascertained before those 
measures can legitimately be interpreted as probabili­
ties of causation. 
The analysis of this paper extends the results reported 
in [Pearl, 1999] [Pearl, 2000, pp. 283-308]. Pearl de­
rived bounds and identification conditions under cer­
tain assumptions of exogeneity and monotonicity, and 
this paper narrows his bounds and weakens his as­
sumptions. In particular, we show that for most of 
Pearl's results, the assumption of strong exogeneity 
can be replaced by weak exogeneity (to be defined in 
Section 3.3). Additionally, we show that the point 
estimates that Pearl obtained under the assumption 
of monotonicity (Definition 6) constitute valid lower 
bounds when monotonicity is not assumed. Finally, 
we prove that the bounds derived by Pearl, as well 
as those provided in this paper are sharp, that is, 
they cannot be improved without strengthening the 
assumptions. We illustrate the use of our results in 
the context of legal disputes (Section 4) and personal 
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decision making (Section 5) . 
2 Probabilities of Causation: 
Definitions 
In this section, we present the definitions for the three 
aspects of causation as defined in [Pearl, 1999]. We 
use the language of counterfactuals in its structural 
model semantics, as given in Balke and Pearl (1995), 
Galles and Pearl (1997, 1998), and Halpern (1998). 
We use Yx = y to denote the counterfactual sentence 
"Variable Y would have the value y, had X been x." 
The structural model interpretation of this sentence 
reads: "Deleting the equation for X from the model 
and setting the value of X to a constant x will yield a 
solution in which variable Y will take on the value y." 
One property that the counterfactual relationships sat­
isfy is the consistency condition [Robins, 1987]: 
(X= x) :::} (Yx = Y) (1) 
stating that if we intervene and set the experimental 
conditions X = x equal to those prevailing before the 
intervention, we should not expect any change in the 
response variable Y. This property will be used in sev­
eral derivations of this section and Section 3. For de­
tailed exposition of the structural account and its ap­
plications see [Pearl, 2000, chapter 7]. For notational 
simplicity, we limit the discussion to binary variables; 
extension to multi-valued variables are straightforward 
(see Pearl 2000, p. 286, footnote 5). 
Definition 1 (Probability of necessity (PN)) 
Let X and Y be two binary variables in a causal model 
M, let x and y stand for the propositions X = true 
and Y = true, respectively, and x' and y' for their 
complements. The probability of necessity is defined 
as the expression 
PN = P(Yx' =f alse I X= true, Y =true) 
P(y��lx,y) (2) 
In other words, PN stands for the probability that 
event y would not have occurred in the absence of event 
x, y�,, given that x and y did in fact occur. 
Note that lower case letters (e.g., x, y) stand for propo­
sitions (or events). Note also the abbreviations Yx for 
Yx = true and y� for Yx = false. Readers accustomed 
to writing "A > B" for the counterfactual "B if it were 
� A" can translate Eq. (2) to read PN = P(x' > y'lx,y). 
PN has applications in epidemiology, legal reasoning, 
and artificial intelligence (AI). Epidemiologists have 
long been concerned with estimating the probability 
that a certain case of disease is attributable to a par­
ticular exposure, which is normally interpreted coun­
terfactually as "the probability that disease would not 
have occurred in the absence of exposure, given that 
disease and exposure did in fact occur." This counter­
factual notion is also used frequently in lawsuits, where 
legal responsibility is at the center of contention (see 
Section 4). 
Definition 2 (Probability of sufficiency (PS)) 
� PS = P(YxiY',x') (3) 
PS finds applications in policy analysis, AI, and psy­
chology. A policy maker may well be interested in the 
dangers that a certain exposure may present to the 
healthy population [Khoury et al., 1989]. Counterfac­
tually, this notion is expressed as the "probability that 
a healthy unexposed individual would have gotten the 
disease had he/she been exposed." In psychology, PS 
serves as the basis for Cheng's (1997) causal power the­
ory [Glymour, 1998], which attempts to explain how 
humans judge causal strength among events. In AI, 
PS plays a major role in the generation of explana­
tions [Pearl, 2000, pp. 221-223]. 
Definition 3 (Probability of necessity and sufficiency 
(PNS)) 
(4) 
PNS stands for the probability that y would respond 
to x both ways, and therefore measures both the suf­
ficiency and necessity of x to produce y. 
Although none of these quantities is sufficient for de­
termining the others, they are not entirely indepen­
dent, as shown in the following lemma. 
Lemma 1 The probabilities of causation satisfy the 
following relationship [Pearl, 1999] : 
PNS = P(x,y)PN + P(x',y')PS (5) 
Since all the causal measures defined above invoke 
conditionalization on y, and since y is presumed af­
fected by x, the antecedent of the counterfactual Yx, 
we know that none of these quantities is identifiable 
from knowledge of frequency data alone, even under 
condition of no confounding. However, useful infor­
mation in the form of bounds may be derived for 
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these quantities from frequency data, especially when 
knowledge about causal effects P(yx) and P(Yx') is 
also available1. Moreover, under some general assump­
tions about the data-generating process, these quanti­
ties may even be identified. 
3 Bounds and Conditions of 
Identification 
In this section we will assume that experimental data 
will be summarized in the form of the causal effects 
P(yx) and P(Yx' ), and nonexperimental data will be 
summarized in the form of the joint probability func­
tion: Pxy = {P(x, y), P(x', y), P(x,y'), P(x', y')}. 
3.1 Linear programming formulation 
Since every causal model induces a joint probability 
distribution on the four binary variables: X, Y, Yx 
and Yx', specifying the sixteen parameters of this dis­
tribution would suffice for computing the PN, PS, and 
PNS. Moreover, since Y is a deterministic function of 
the other three variables, the problem is fully specified 
by the following set of eight parameters: 
Plll = P(yx,Yx', x) 
Pllo = P(yx, Yx', x') 
P101= P(yx, y�,, x) 
PlOO = P(yx, y�,, x') 
Poll= P(y�, Yx', x) 
Pow= P(y�, Yx', x') 
POOl= P(y�, y�,, x) 
Pooo = P(y�, y�,, x') 
= P(x, Y,Yx') 
= P(x', y, Yx) 
= P(x, y, y�,) 
= P(x',y', yx) 
= P(x,y', Yx') 
= P(x', y, y�) 
= P(x, y', y�,) 
= P(x', y', y�) 
where we have used the consistency condition Eq. (1). 
These parameters are further constrained by the prob­
abilistic equality 
1 1 1 
I: I: L:Pijk = 1 
i=O j=O k=O 
Pijk :2:0 for i, j, k E {0, 1} (6) 
In addition, the nonexperimental probabilities Pxy 
impose the constraints: 
Plll + P101 
Poll+ Po01 
Pno +Pow 
P(x,y) 
P(x, y') 
P(x', y) 
(7) 
1The causal effects P(yx) and P(Yx') can be estimated 
reliably from controlled experimental studies, and from 
certain observational (i.e., nonexperimental) studies which 
permit the control of confounding through adjustment of 
covariates [Pearl, 1995]. 
and the causal effects, P(yx) and P(Yx' ), impose the 
constraints: 
Plll + Pno + P101 + Pwo 
P111 + Pno +Poll +Pow 
The quantities we wish to bound are: 
PNS 
PN 
PS 
PlOl + PlOO 
P101 / P(x, y) 
Pioo/ P(x', y') 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
Optimizing the functions in (9)-(11), subject to equal­
ity constraints, defines a linear programming (LP) 
problem that lends itself to closed-form solution. Balke 
(1995, Appendix B) describes a computer program 
that takes symbolic descriptions of LP problems and 
returns symbolic expressions for the desired bounds. 
The program works by systematically enumerating the 
vertices of the constraint polygon of the dual prob­
lem. The bounds reported in this paper were produced 
(or tested) using Balke's program, and will be stated 
here without proofs; their correctness can be verified 
by manually enumerating the vertices as described in 
[Balke, 1995, Appendix B]. These bounds are guaran­
teed to be sharp because the optimization is global. 
3.2 Bounds with no assumptions 
3.2.1 Given nonexperimental data 
Given Pxy, constraints (6) and (7) induce the follow­
ing upper bound on PNS: 
0:::; PNS:::; P(x,y) + P(x', y'). (12) 
However, PN and PS are not constrained by Pxy. 
These constraints also induce bounds on the causal 
effects P(yx) and P(Yx' ) :  
P(x, y) 
P(x',y) 
::=; P(yx) ::=; 
:::; P(Yx') :::; 
3.2.2 Given causal effects 
1- P(x, y') 
1- P(x', y') (13) 
Given constraints (6) and (8), the bounds induced on 
PNS are: 
max[O, P(yx)- P(Yx')] :::; PNS:::; min[J-'(Yx), P(y�,) ]  
(14) 
with no constraints on PN and PS. 
3.2.3 Given both nonexperimental data and 
causal effects 
Given the constraints (6), (7) and (8), the following 
bounds are induced on the three probabilities of cau-
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sation: 
0 
P(yx) - P(Yx') 
P(y) - P(Yx') 
P(yx)- P(y) 
} �PNS (15) 
{ 
P(yx) } 
PNS P(y�,) < min P(x, y) + P(x', y') 
P(yx)- P(Yx') + P(x, y') + P(x', y) 
max { 
max { 
0 
P(y)-P(Yz') 
P(x,y) 
} :::; PN:::; min { 
(16) 
P(y',)-
1
P(x',y') } 
P(x,y) 
(17) 
P(yz
l
!P(x,y) 
} 
p x',y') 
(18) 
Thus we see that some information about PN and 
PS can be extracted without making any assumptions 
about the data-generating process. Furthermore, com­
bined data from both experimental and nonexperimen­
tal studies yield information that neither study alone 
can provide. 
3.3 Bounds under exogeneity (no 
confounding) 
Definition 4 (Exogeneity) 
A variable X is said to be exogenous for Y in model 
Miff 
P(yx) = P(yjx) and P(Yx') = P(yjx'). (19) 
In words, the way Y would potentially respond to ex­
perimental conditions x or x' is independent of the ac­
tual value of X. 
Eq. (19) is also known as "no-confounding" 
[Robins and Greenland, 1989], "as if randomized," or 
"weak ignorability" [Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983]. 
Combining Eq. (19) with the constraints of (6)-(8), the 
linear programming optimization (Section 3.1) yields 
the following results: 
Theorem 1 Under condition of exogeneity ,  the three 
probabilities of causation are bounded as follows: 
under the condition of no-confounding the lower bound 
for PN can be expressed as 
PN > 1-
1 � 1- -1- (23) - P(yjx)/P(yjx') RR 
where RR � P(yjx)/ P(yjx') is called relative risk 
in epidemiology. Courts have often used the condi­
tion RR > 2 as a criterion for legal responsibility 
[Bailey et al., 1994]. Eq. (23) shows that this practice 
represents a conservative interpretation of the "more 
probable than not" standard (assuming no confound­
ing); PN must indeed be higher than 0.5 if RR exceeds 
2. 
3.3.1 Bounds under strong exogeneity 
The condition of exogeneity, as defined in Eq. (19) 
is testable by comparing experimental and nonexperi­
mental data. A stronger version of exogeneity can be 
defined as the joint independence {Yx, Yx'} llX which 
was called "strong ignorability" by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983). Though untestable, such joint indepen­
dence is implied when we assert the absence of factors 
that simultaneously affect exposure and outcome. 
Definition 5 (Strong Exogeneity) 
A variable X is said to be strongly exogenous for Y in 
model M iff {Yx, Yx'} llX, that is, 
P(yx, Yx' jx) = P(yx, Yx') 
P(Yx, y�, jx) = P(yx, y�,) 
P(y�, Yx'lx) P(y�, Yx') (24) 
P(y�, y�, jx) P(y�, y�,) 
Remarkably, the added constraints introduced by 
strong exogeneity do not alter the bounds of Eqs. (20)­
(22). They do, however, strengthen Lemma 1: 
Theorem 2 If strong exogeneity holds, the probabili­
ties PN, PS, and PNS are constrained by the bounds 
of Eqs. {20}-{22), and, moreover, PN, PS, and PNS 
are related to each other as follows [Pearl, 1999]: 
PN 
PS 
PNS 
P(yjx) 
PNS 
P(y'lx') 
(25) 
(26) 
max(O, P(yjx)- P(yjx')]:::; PNS:::; min(P(yjx), P(y'jx')] (20) 
max(O, P(ylx)- P(ylx')] < PN < min[P(ylx),P(y'lx')] 21 P(ylx) - - P(ylx) 
( ) 3.4 Identifiability under monotonicity 
max(O, P(ylx)- P(ylx')] < PS < min(P(ylx), P(y'lx')] (22) D fi •t• 6 (M t · 't ) P( 'I ') - - P( 'I ' ) e m wn ono omc� y Y x Y x A variable Y is said to be monotonic relative to vari-
[Pearl, 1999] derived Eqs. (20)-(22) under a stronger 
condition of exogeneity (see Definition 5). We see that 
able X in a causal model M iff 
Y� 1\ Yx' = false (27) 
UNCERTAINTY IN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE PROCEEDINGS 2000 593 
Monotonicity expresses the assumption that a change 
from X = false to X = true cannot, under any cir­
cumstance make Y change from true to false. In epi­
demiology, this assumption is often expressed as "no 
prevention," that is, no individual in the population 
can be helped by exposure to the risk factor. 
In the linear programming formulation of Section 3.1, 
monotonicity narrows the feasible space to the mani­
fold: 
Pon 0 
P01o 0 
3.4.1 Given nonexperimental data 
(28) 
Under the constraints (6), (7), and (28), we find the 
same bounds for PNS as the ones obtained under no 
assumptions (Eq. (12)) .  Moreover, there are still no 
constraints on PN and PS. Thus, with nonexperimen­
tal data alone, the monotonicity assumption does not 
provide new information. 
However, the monotonicity assumption induces 
sharper bounds on the causal effects P(yx) and P(Yx' ): 
P(y) 
P(x', y) 
:S P(yx) :S 
:S P(Yx•) :S 
1- P(x, y') 
P(y) (29) 
Compared with Eq. (13), the lower bound for P(Yx) 
and the upper bound for P(Yx') are tightened. The 
importance of Eq. (29) lies in providing a simple nec­
essary test for the commonly made assumption of 
"no-prevention." These inequalities are sharp, in the 
sense that every combination of experimental and non­
experimental data that satisfy these inequalities can 
be generated from some causal model in which Y is 
monotonic in X. Alternatively, if the no-prevention as­
sumption is theoretically unassailable, the inequalities 
of Eq. (29) can be used for testing the compatibility of 
the experimental and non-experimental data, namely, 
whether subjects used in clinical trials were sampled 
from the same target population, characterized by the 
joint distribution Pxy. 
3.4.2 Given causal effects 
Constraints (6), (8), and (28) induce no constraints on 
PN and PS, while the value of PNS is fully determined: 
That is, under the assumption of monotonicity, PNS 
can be determined by experimental data alone, al­
though the joint event Yx 1\ y�. can never be observed. 
3.4.3 Given both nonexperimental data and 
causal effects 
Under the constraints (6)-(8) and (28) , the values of 
PN, PS, and PNS are all determined precisely. 
Theorem 3 If Y is monotonic relative to X, then 
PNS, PN, and PS are given by 
PNS P(yx, Y�·) = P(yx) - P(Yx') (30) 
PN P(y�. lx, y) = 
P(y) - P(Yx') (31) 
P(x, y) 
PS P(yx lx', y') = 
P(yx) - P(y) (32) 
P(x', y') 
Eqs. (30)-(32) are applicable to situations where, in 
addition to observational probabilities, we also have 
information about the causal effects P(yx) and P(Yx' ). 
Such information may be obtained either directly, 
through separate experimental studies, or indirectly, 
from observational studies in which certain identifying 
assumptions are deemed plausible (e.g., assumptions 
that permits identification through adjustment of co­
variates) [Pearl, 1995]. 
3.5 Identifiability under monotonicity and 
exogeneity 
Under the assumption of monotonicity, if we further 
assume exogeneity, then P(yx) and P(Yx') are identi­
fied through Eq. (19), and from theorem 3 we conclude 
that PNS, PN, and PS are all identifiable. 
Theorem 4 (Identifiability under exogeneity and 
monotonicity) 
If X is exogenous and Y is monotonic relative to X, 
then the probabilities PN, PS, and PNS are all identi­
fiable, and are given by 
PNS 
PN 
PS 
P(yjx)- P(yjx') (33) 
P(y)- P(yjx') = P(yjx)- P(yjx') (34) 
P(x, y) P(yjx) 
P(yjx)- P(y) P(yjx)- P(yjx') (3S) 
P(x', y') P(y'ix') 
These expressions are to be recognized as familiar mea­
sures of attribution that often appear in the literature. 
The r.h.s. of (33) is called "risk-difference" in epi­
demiology, and is also misnamed "attributable risk" 
[Hennekens and Buring, 1987, p. 87]. The probabil­
ity of necessity, PN, is given by the excess-risk-ratio 
(ERR) 
PN = 
P(ylx)- P(ylx') = 1 __ 
1 
(36) 
P(ylx) RR 
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often misnamed as the attributable fraction, 
attributable-rate percent, attributed fraction for the ex­
posed [Kelsey et al., 1996, p. 38], or attributable pro­
portion [Cole, 1997]. The reason we consider these la­
bels to be misnomers is that ERR invokes purely sta­
tistical relationships, hence it cannot in itself serve to 
measure attribution, unless fortified with some causal 
assumptions. Exogeneity and monotonicity are the 
causal assumptions that endow ERR with attribu­
tional interpretation, and these assumptions are rarely 
made explicit in the literature on attribution. 
The expression for PS is likewise quite revealing 
PS = [P(yix) - P(yix')]/[1- P(yix')], (37) 
as it coincides with what epidemiologists call the "rela­
tive difference" [Shep, 1958], which is used to measure 
the susceptibility of a population to a risk factor x. It 
also coincides with what Cheng calls "causal power" 
(1997), namely, the effect of x on y after suppressing 
"all other causes of y." See Pearl (1999) for additional 
discussions of these expressions. 
To appreciate the difference between Eqs. (31) and 
(36) we can rewrite Eq. (31) as 
PN 
P(yix)P(x) + P(yix')P(x')- P(Yx') 
P(yix)P(x) 
P(yix)- P(yix') + 
P(yix')- P(Yx' h8) 
P(yix) P(x, y) 
The first term on the r.h.s. of (38) is the familiar 
ERR as in (36), and represents the value of PN un­
der exogeneity. The second term represents the cor­
rection needed to account for X's non-exogeneity, i.e. 
P(Yx') =I P(ylx'). We will call the r.h.s. of (38) by 
corrected excess-risk-ratio (CERR). 
From Eqs. (33)-(35) we see that the three notions 
of causation satisfy the simple relationships given by 
Eqs. (25) and (26) which we obtained under the strong 
exogeneity condition. In fact, we have the following 
theorem. 
Theorem 5 Monotonicity (27} and exogeneity (19} 
together imply strong exogeneity (24). 
3.6 Summary of results 
Table 1 lists the best estimate of PN under various 
assumptions and various types of data-the stronger 
the assumptions, the more informative the estimates. 
We see that the excess-risk-ratio (ERR), which epi­
demiologists commonly identify with the probability 
of causation, is a valid measure of PN only when 
two assumptions can be ascertained: exogeneity (i.e., 
no confounding) and monotonicity (i.e., no preven-
Table 1: PN as a function of assumptions (exogene­
ity or monotonicity) and available data (experimen­
tal or nonexperimental or both). ERR stands of the 
excess-risk-ratio and CERR is given in Eq. (38). The 
non-entries (-) represent vacuous bounds, that is, 
0 < PN < 1. 
Assumptions 
Exo. Mono. 
+ + 
+ 
+ 
Exp. 
ERR 
bounds 
Data Available 
Non-exp. Combined 
ERR ERR 
bounds bounds 
CERR 
bounds 
tion). When monotonicity does not hold, ERR pro­
vides merely a lower bound for PN, as shown in 
Eq. (21). (The upper bound is usually unity.) In 
the presence of confounding, ERR must be corrected 
by the additive term [P(yix') - P(Yx' )]/ P(x, y), as 
stated in (38). In other words, when confounding bias 
(of the causal effect) is positive, PN is higher than 
ERR by the amount of this additive term. Clearly, 
owing to the division by P(x, y), the PN bias can 
be many times higher than the causal effect bias 
P(ylx') - P(Yx' ) .  However, confounding results only 
from association between exposure and other factors 
that affect the outcome; one need not be concerned 
with associations between such factors and suscepti­
bility to exposure, as is often assumed in the literature 
(Khoury et al., 1989, Glymour, 1998]. 
The last two rows in Table 1 correspond to no as­
sumptions about exogeneity, and they yield vacuous 
bounds for PN when data come from either experi­
mental or observational study. In contrast, informa­
tive bounds (17) or point estimates (38) are obtained 
when data from experimental and observational stud­
ies are combined. Concrete use of such combination 
will be illustrated in Section 4. 
4 Example 1: Legal Responsibility 
A lawsuit is filed against the manufacturer of drug x, 
charging that the drug is likely to have caused the 
death of Mr. A, who took the drug to relieve symptom 
S associated with disease D. 
The manufacturer claims that experimental data on 
patients with symptom S show conclusively that drug 
x may cause only minor increase in death rates. The 
plaintiff argues, however, that the experimental study 
is of little relevance to this case, because it repre­
sents the effect of the drug on all patients, not on 
patients like Mr. A who actually died while using 
drug x. Moreover, argues the plaintiff, Mr. A is 
unique in that he used the drug on his own voli-
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Table 2: Frequency data (hypothetical) obtained in 
experimental and nonexperimental studies, comparing 
deaths (in thousands) among drug users (x) and non­
users (x'). 
Experimental Non experimental 
X 
Deaths(y) 16 
Survivals(y') 984 
x' 
14 
986 
X 
2 
998 
x' 
28 
972 
tion, unlike subjects in the experimental study who 
took the drug to comply with experimental protocols. 
To support this argument, the plaintiff furnishes non­
experimental data indicating that most patients who 
chose drug x would have been alive if it were not for 
the drug. The manufacturer counter-argues by stat­
ing that: (1) counterfactual speculations regarding 
whether patients would or would not have died are 
purely metaphysical and should be avoided, and (2) 
nonexperimental data should be dismissed a priori, on 
the ground that such data may be highly biased; for 
example, incurable terminal patients might be more 
inclined to use drug x if it provides them greater symp­
tomatic relief. The court must now decide, based on 
both the experimental and non-experimental studies, 
what the probability is that drug x was in fact the 
cause of Mr. A's death. 
The (hypothetical) data associated with the two stud­
ies are shown in Table 2. The experimental data pro­
vide the estimates 
P(yx) 
P(Yx') 
P(y�,) 
= 16/1000 
= 14/1000 
= 1- P(Yx') 
= 0.016 
= 0.014 
= 0.986 
The non-experimental data provide the estimates 
P(y) 
P(x, y) 
P(x', y') 
=30/2000 
= 2/2000 
= 972/2000 
= 0.015 
= 0.001 
= 0.486 
Since both the experimental and nonexperimental data 
are available, we can obtain bounds on all three prob­
abilities of causation through Eqs. (15)-(18) without 
making any assumptions about the underlying mech­
anisms. The data in Table 2 imply the following nu­
merical results: 
0.002 ::; P N S ::; 0.016 
1.0 ::; P N ::; 1.0 
0.002 ::; p s ::; 0.031 
(39) 
(40) 
( 41) 
These figures show that although surviving patients 
who didn't take drug x have only less than 3.1% chance 
to die had they taken the drug, there is 100% assurance 
(barring sample errors) that those who took the drug 
and died would have survived had they not taken the 
drug. Thus the plaintiff was correct; drug x was in 
fact responsible for the death of Mr. A. 
If we assume that drug x can only cause, but never 
prevent, death, Theorem 3 is applicable and Eqs. (30)­
(32) yield 
PNS 
PN 
PS 
0.002 
1.0 
0.002 
(42) 
( 43) 
(44) 
Thus, we conclude that drug x was responsible for the 
death of Mr. A, with or without the no-prevention as­
sumption. 
Note that a straightforward use of the experimental 
excess-risk-ratio would yield a much lower (and incor­
rect) result: 
P(yx)- P(Yx') = 
0.016-0.014 = 0_125 (45) P(yx) 0.016 
Evidently, what the experimental study does not re­
veal is that, given a choice, terminal patients stay away 
from drug x. Indeed, if there were any terminal pa­
tients who would choose x (given the choice), then the 
control group (x') would have included some such pa­
tients (due to randomization) and so the proportion 
of deaths among the control group P(Yx') would have 
been higher than P( x', y), the population proportion 
of terminal patients avoiding x. However, the equality 
P(Yx') = P(y, x') tells us that no such patients were 
present in the control group, hence (by randomization) 
no such patients exist in the population at large and 
therefore none of the patients who freely chose drug x 
was a terminal case; all were susceptible to x. 
The numbers in Table 2 were obviously contrived to 
show the usefulness of the bounds in Eqs. (15)-(18). 
Nevertheless, it is instructive to note that a combi­
nation of experimental and non-experimental studies 
may unravel what experimental studies alone will not 
reveal. 
5 Example 2: Personal Decision 
Making 
Consider the case of Mr. B, who is one of the surviving 
patients in the observational study of Table 2. Mr. B 
wonders how safe it would be for him to take drug 
x, given that he has refrained thus far from taking 
the drug and that he managed to survive the disease. 
His argument for switching to the drug rests on the 
observation that only 2 out of 1000 drug users died in 
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the observational study, which he considers a rather 
small risk to take, given the effectiveness of the drug 
as a pain killer. 
Conventional wisdom instructs us to warn Mr. B 
against consulting a nonexperimental study in matters 
of decisions, since such studies are marred with un­
controlled factors, which tend to bias effect estimates. 
Specifically, the death rate of 0.002 among drug users 
may be indicative of low tolerance to discomfort, or 
of membership in a medically-informed socio-economic 
group. Such factors do not apply to Mr. B, who did not 
use the drug in the past (be it by choice, instinct or ig­
norance), and who is now considering switching to the 
drug by rational deliberation. Conventional wisdom 
urges us to refer Mr. B to the randomized experimen­
tal study of Table 2, from which the death rate under 
controlled administration of the drug was evaluated to 
be P(yx) = 0.016, eight times higher than 0.002. 
What would his risk of death be, if Mr. B decides to 
start taking the drug? 0.2 percent or 1.6 percent? 
The answer is that neither number is correct. Mr. B 
cannot be treated as a random patient in either study, 
because his history of not using the drug and his sur­
vival thus far puts him in a unique category of patients, 
for which the effect of the drug was not studied. 2 
These two attributes provide extra evidence about 
Mr. B's sensitivity to the drug. This became clear 
already in Example 1, where we discovered definite re­
lationships among these attributes - for some obscure 
reasons, terminal patients chose not to use the drug. 
To properly account for this additional evidence, the 
risk should be measured through the counterfactual 
expression P S = P(yx jx1, y1); the probability that a 
patient who survived with no drug would have died 
had he/she taken the drug. The appropriate bound 
for this probability is given in Eq. (41): 
0.002 ::; p s ::; 0.031 
Thus, Mr. B's risk of death (upon switching to drug 
usage) can be as high as 3.1 percent; more than 15 
times his intuitive estimate of 0.2 percent, and almost 
twice the naive estimate obtained from the experimen­
tal study. 
However, if the drug can safely be assumed to have 
no death-preventing effects, then monotonicity applies, 
and the appropriate bound is given by Eq. (44), PS = 
0.002, which coincides with Mr. B's intuition. 
2The appropriate experimental design for measuring the 
risk of interest is to conduct a randomized clinical trial on 
patients in the category of Mr. B, that is, to subject a 
random sample of non-users to a period of drug treatment 
and measure their rate of survival. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper shows how useful information about proba­
bilities of causation can be obtained from experimental 
and observational studies, with weak or no assump­
tions about the data-generating process. We have 
shown that, in general, bounds for the probabilities 
of causation can be obtained from combined experi­
mental and nonexperimental data. These bounds were 
proven to be sharp and, therefore, they represent the 
ultimate information that can be extracted from sta­
tistical methods. We clarify the two basic assumptions 
- exogeneity and monotonicity - that must be ascer­
tained before statistical measures such as excess-risk­
ratio could represent attributional quantities such as 
probability of causation. 
One application of this analysis lies in the automatic 
generation of verbal explanations, where the distinc­
tion between necessary and sufficient causes has impor­
tant ramifications. As can be seen from the definitions 
and examples discussed in this paper, necessary cau­
sation is a concept tailored to a specific event under 
consideration (singular causation), whereas sufficient 
causation is based on the general tendency of certain 
event types to produce other event types. Adequate 
explanations should respect both aspects. Clearly, 
some balance must be made between the necessary 
and the sufficient components of causal explanation, 
and the present paper illuminates this balance by for­
mally explicating the basic relationships between the 
two components. In Pearl (2000, chapter 10) it is fur­
ther shown that PN and PS are too crude for cap­
turing probabilities of causation in multi-stage scenar­
ios, and that the structure of the intermediate pro­
cess leading from cause to effect must enter the defi­
nitions of causation and explanation. Such consider­
ations will be the subject of future investigation (See 
[Halpern and Pearl, 2000]). 
Another important application of probabilities of cau­
sation is found in decision making problems. As was 
pointed out in Pearl (2000, pp. 217-219) and illustrated 
in Section 5, the counterfactual "y would have been 
true if x were true" can often be translated into a con­
ditional action claim "given that currently x and y are 
false, y will be true if we do x." The evaluation of 
such conditional predictions, and the probabilities of 
such predictions, are commonplace in decision mak­
ing situations, where actions are brought into focus by 
certain eventualities that demand remedial correction. 
In troubleshooting, for example, we observe undesir­
able effects Y = y that are potentially caused by other 
conditions X = x and we wish to predict whether an 
action that brings about a change in X would rem­
edy the situation. The information provided by the 
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evidence y and x is extremely valuable, and it must 
be processed before we can predict the effect of any 
action3. Thus, the expressions developed in this pa­
per constitute bounds on the effectiveness of pending 
policies, when full knowledge of the state of affairs is 
not available, yet the pre-action states of the decision 
variable (X) and the outcome variable (Y) are known. 
For these bounds to be valid in policy making, the 
data generating model must be time-invariant, that is, 
all probabilities associated with the model should rep­
resent epistemic uncertainty about static, albeit un­
known boundary conditions U = u. The constancy of 
U is well justified in the control and diagnosis of phys­
ical systems, where U represents fixed, but unknown 
physical characteristics of devices or subsystems. The 
constancy approximation is also justified in the health 
sciences where patients' genetic attributes and physi­
cal characteristics can be assumed relatively constant 
between observation and treatment. For instance, if a 
patient in the example of Section 5 wishes to assess the 
risk of switching from no drug to drug, it is reasonable 
to assume that this patient's susceptibility to the drug 
remains constant through the interim period of anal­
ysis. Therefore, the risk associated with this patient's 
decision will be well represented by the counterfactual 
expression PS = P(Yxlx',y'), and should be assessed 
by the bounds in Eq. (41). 
The constancy assumption is less justified in economic 
systems, where agents are bombarded by rapidly fluc­
tuating streams of external forces ( "shocks" in econo­
metric terminology) and inter-agents stimuli. These 
forces and stimuli may vary substantially during the 
policy making interval and they require, therefore, de­
tailed time-dependent analysis. The canonical viola­
tion of the constancy assumption occurs, of course, 
in quantum mechanical systems, where the indeter­
minism is "intrinsic" and memory-less, and where the 
existence of a deterministic relationship between the 
boundary conditions and measured quantities is no 
longer a good approximation. A method of incorpo­
rating such intrinsic indeterminism into counterfactual 
analysis is outlined in Pearl (2000, p. 220). 
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